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THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL 
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION: THE NEED FOR MECHANISMS 
TO ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE 
Caitlin M. Bannon* 
Abstract: International parental child abduction is a growing problem, 
the effects of which are devastating for both the children involved and the 
parents who are left behind. When a parent abducts a child across na-
tional borders, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction—an international treaty aimed at the expeditious 
return of the child to his or her country of habitual residence—provides 
the other parent’s primary legal recourse. This Note will examine the 
growing problem of international parental child abduction, including its 
prevalence and consequences, and the role of the Hague Convention in 
addressing this problem. Specifically, it will examine the issue of non-
compliant Contracting States, the effects of that noncompliance, and the 
need for mechanisms to address noncompliance. Finally, this Note will 
examine two bills that have been proposed in the United States Congress 
that address the noncompliance issue and will argue that Congress should 
seriously consider one of these bills. 
Introduction 
So now after four years of trying desperately to be with my son, I find myself 
sitting in a hotel room in São Paulo since September 7th, hoping and praying 
to be reunited with my son, ready to bring him home and resume our life as 
father and son. We have much healing to do. I have never lost hope the day 
would come for us to be together again. I will never give up, but I need help. 
—David Goldman1 
 On June 16, 2004, David Goldman’s life changed forever when he 
became one of countless parents who have fallen victim to interna-
                                                                                                                      
* Comment Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 David Goldman, David’s Story, Bring Sean Home Found., http://bringseanhome. 
org/wordpress/goldman-case/davids-story/ (last visited Jan 20, 2011) [hereinafter David’s 
Story] (excerpting a September 20, 2008 letter from David Goldman to local elected offi-
cials and the media). 
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tional parental child abduction (IPCA).2 In an instant, his life, which 
had seemed to him and his friends to be the American dream, took an 
unforeseen and sudden turn.3 
 David, a New Jersey native, met Bruna Bianchi in Italy in 1997 and 
quickly fell in love with this twenty-three-year-old fashion student from 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.4 Not long after, in December of 1999, David and 
Bruna were wed and began their married life in New Jersey.5 On May 
25, 2000, their son, Sean, was born and the young family was happy as 
could be—life was “like a fairy tale,” as one friend described it.6 Over 
the next four years, David fell in love with his son and changed his work 
schedule to stay at home with Sean; the two developed a “special bond” 
and became inseparable.7 Their closeness only made their later forced 
separation more painful.8 
 On June 16, 2004, David drove Bruna, four-year-old Sean, and Bru-
na’s parents to Newark airport for what was supposed to be a two-week 
vacation in Bruna’s native country.9 Once Bruna arrived in Brazil, how-
ever, she called David and announced that she was never returning to 
the United States, that their marriage was over, and that she was keeping 
Sean in Brazil.10 Even worse, she demanded that David sign away full 
custody of Sean to her and that David never seek criminal charges 
against her.11 Of course, David was devastated, but matters grew worse as 
Bruna continued to call David and make demands and threats.12 Even-
tually David began receiving death threats over the phone from an un-
known man who stated that he knew where David lived and that David 
should prepare to die.13 So quickly, David’s fairy tale had become a 
                                                                                                                      
2 See id. 
3 See Dateline NBC: Bring Sean Home: The Untold Story (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8, 
2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34773680/ns/dateline_nbc-international/ [herein-
after Dateline: Bring Sean Home]; David’s Story, supra note 3. 
4 See Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
5 See id. 
6 See id.; David’s Story, supra note 1. 
7 See Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
8 See id. 
9 Id.; see also Bernard Aronson, Brazil Helps Kidnap American Children, Wall St. J., June 
17, 2009, at A11; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old (CNN television broadcast Mar. 
4, 2009), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0903/04/lkl.01.html (transcript 
only). 
10 Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, su-
pra note 9. 
11 Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, su-
pra note 9. 
12 Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
13 See id. 
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nightmare.14 Once the shock subsided, David realized that Bruna was 
never going to return and that his own wife had kidnapped their be-
loved son.15 David hired an attorney and his legal battle began, though 
he never could have anticipated that it would be nearly five years before 
Sean would finally come home.16 
 Unfortunately, David is not alone in his experience.17 Rather, IPCA 
is a growing problem that affects children and families throughout the 
world.18 Though it is difficult to know for certain just how many Ameri-
can children are currently living abroad as the result of IPCA, a 2006 
estimate placed the number at 11,000.19 Another estimate placed the 
total national and international child abductions at 200,000 per year.20 
These numbers are great and the pain they represent is even greater.21 
 To address the problem of IPCA, the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law established the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention) in 1980 to 
provide a mechanism for protecting abducted children and ensuring 
their quick return to their state of habitual residence.22 By providing a 
civil mechanism by which parents can secure the return of their ab-
ducted children, the Convention has successfully reunited many par-
ents and children.23 Nevertheless, the Convention has presented a 
number of problems, including the issue of noncompliant Contracting 
                                                                                                                      
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the Hague 
Convention, 6 Barry L. Rev. 29, 29–30 (2006). 
18 See Kathleen A. McKee, A Primer on International Parental Abduction, 6 Regent J. Int’l 
L. 37, 38–39 (2008); Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 29–30. 
19 Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 29. 
20 A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of International Child Abduction: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 110 (2004) [hereinafter A Parent’s Worst 
Nightmare] (prepared statement of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, 
National Center for Missing & Exploited Children); Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 29. 
21 See Office of Children’s Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Travel.State.Gov, 6–8 (2009), 
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/2009HagueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf 
[hereinafter Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention]; see also Walsh & Savard, supra 
note 17, at 29–30. 
22 International Child Abduction Convention Between the United States of America 
and Other Governments, pmbl, adopted Oct. 25, 1980, entered into force in the United States 
July 1, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter International Child Abduc-
tion Convention]. 
23 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 10–11. 
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States that fail to fulfill their obligations under the Convention.24 The 
results can be devastating, and in many cases the ultimate result is that 
the children are not returned.25 
 This Note examines the issue of IPCA, the protections and proc-
esses provided by the Convention, and the problem of noncompliance. 
It argues that there is a serious need for greater mechanisms for ensur-
ing compliance with the Convention and focuses specifically on one 
legislative solution. Part I describes IPCA, its prevalence, and the det-
rimental effects that it has on children and parents. Part II examines 
the Convention, its goals and obligations, and how it operates among 
Contracting States. Part III briefly examines some of the problems pre-
sented by the Convention while focusing on the issue of Contracting 
States that fail to fulfill their obligations under the Convention. It ex-
plores the Goldman case in greater detail as an example of the detri-
mental effects of noncompliance. Finally, Part IV offers possible solu-
tions for addressing noncompliance. In particular, it analyzes two bills 
that have been proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives that seek 
to provide mechanisms for ensuring compliance, and it argues that 
Congress should seriously consider one of these bills. 
I. International Parental Child Abduction:  
An Overview of the Issue 
 International parental child abduction is the wrongful removal or 
retention of a child, effected by a parent, outside the country of the 
child’s “habitual residence” and in violation of the other parent’s 
“rights of custody” under the law of the country of habitual residence.26 
The number of annual IPCA cases has increased significantly over the 
past two decades, largely because of the increased opportunities for 
international travel and international communication.27 As the Honor-
                                                                                                                      
24 Id. at 12, 26; see McKee, supra note 18, at 61–62; Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 
56–57; Laura McCue, Note, Left Behind: The Failure of the United States to Fight for the Return of 
Victims of International Child Abduction, 28 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 85, 104–06 (2004). 
25 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 43–63 (providing a 
list and synopsis of all “unresolved return applications” in noncompliant countries). 
26 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 3. 
27 See A Parent’s Worst Nightmare, supra note 20, at 110 (prepared statement of the Hon. 
Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National Center for Missing & Exploited Chil-
dren); Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Child Abduction 2 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999); Outline: Hague Child Abduction Conven-
tion, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L., 1 (Sept. 2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
outline28e.pdf [hereinafter Convention Outline]; Hon. William Rigler & Howard L. Wieder, 
The Epidemic of Parental Child-Snatching: An Overview: Attempts to Prevent Parental Child Abduc-
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able Dennis DeConcini stated before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, “As the globe shrinks and international travel becomes more 
commonplace, more and more [child abduction] cases involve the 
transportation of a child across a national border.”28 Moreover, mar-
riages and divorces between binational couples have increased.29 Such 
marriages inherently possess “cultural, ethnic, and religious differ-
ences” which are often a significant factor in IPCA.30 This factor, com-
bined with the increasing divorce rate globally and the fact that chil-
dren of such binational marriages often maintain dual citizenship and 
possess two passports, is largely responsible for the increase in IPCA.31 
 In the past, parental child abductions were thought to be commit-
ted primarily by fathers who were dissatisfied with their access to and 
control of their children following a divorce; however, more recent stu-
dies indicate that IPCA is committed more often by mothers than by 
fathers.32 Very often, IPCA occurs after the mother has moved abroad 
with the father and then later wishes to return to her native country.33 
Thus, IPCA usually occurs when the taking parent (TP) takes the child 
away from his or her country of habitual residence or when the child is 
permitted to go abroad to visit the TP and then not permitted to re-
turn.34 
                                                                                                                      
tion, Applicable United States Laws, and the Hague Convention, Travel.State.Gov, http:// 
travel.state.gov/abduction/resources/resources_545.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
Though it is very difficult to estimate how many IPCA cases occur each year, annual esti-
mates have shown marked increases: the estimated total number of Convention cases in 
1996 was 1250, and the estimated number of Convention cases involving the U.S. in 2008 
was 1426. Beaumont & McEleavy, supra, at 1; Report on Compliance with the Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 21, at 6. 
28 A Parent’s Worst Nightmare, supra note 20, at 110 (prepared statement of the Hon. Den-
nis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children) 
(testifying in support of H.R. 4347, the International Assistance to Missing and Exploited 
Children Act of 2004). The Act was never enacted. H.R. 4347, 180th Cong. (2004); see H.R. 
4347, The Library of Congress: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d108:h.r.04347: (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (indicating that the latest major action on the 
bill was referral to subcommittee). 
29 A Parent’s Worst Nightmare, supra note 20, at 110 (prepared statement of the Hon. 
Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National Center for Missing & Exploited Chil-
dren); Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 2; Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1; 
Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
30 Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27; see also Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 2; 
Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1. 
31 Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27; see also Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 2; 
Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1. 
32 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 3–4. 
33 Id. This was the situation in the Goldman case. Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
34 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 8. 
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 There is a wide range of motivations and self-justifications that 
leads TPs to abduct their children.35 For example, some TPs take their 
children away from the left-behind parent (LBP) because he or she 
finds “fault with the other parent for nonsensical transgressions.”36 
Some TPs abduct their children for revenge after the relationship with 
the LBP has become contentious or has ended.37 Others take their 
children because they believe it to be in the best interests of the child, 
either to remove the child from a dangerous environment or to ensure 
that the child is brought up in a more “‘suitable’ society or environ-
ment.”38 Even more simply, a TP may no longer wish to remain in a re-
lationship with the other parent and may wish to return to his or her 
native country, and so take the child and leave.39 
 Though many TPs feel that they are acting in the best interests of 
the child, or at least justify their actions that way, IPCA is very rarely in 
the best interests of the child; rather, it can have extremely negative 
short- and long-term effects.40 Abducted children are “often taken from 
a familiar environment and suddenly isolated from their extended fam-
ilies, friends, classmates, and community.”41 In some cases, the child is 
even separated from siblings.42 Efforts to avoid law enforcement often 
result in repeated relocations that interfere with school attendance and 
the development of relationships with new friends.43 As a result, an ab-
ducted child often suffers from long periods without schooling and is 
prevented from making new close friends.44 In addition, TPs sometimes 
change children’s names and appearance.45 Moreover, an abducted 
child is forced to deal with the separation from the LBP, and in some 
                                                                                                                      
35 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 11; Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
36 Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
37 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 11; Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
38 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 11; Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
39 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 11. 
40 Trevor Buck, International Child Law 131 (2005); Report on Compliance with the 
Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7 (“Parental child abduction is a tragedy because it 
affects some of society’s most vulnerable individuals.”); Rigler & Wieder, supra note 27. 
41 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7; see Buck, supra 
note 40, at 131. 
42 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7; see Buck, supra 
note 40, at 131. 
43 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7; see Buck, supra 
note 40, at 131. 
44 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7; see Buck, supra 
note 40, at 131. 
45 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 7. 
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cases is told that “their other parent is dead, does not want them, or has 
not tried to get them back.”46 
 IPCA can result in “serious emotional and psychological prob-
lems.”47 As reported by the Office of Children’s Issues (OCI) within the 
U.S. Department of State, “Research shows that recovered children of-
ten experience a range of problems including anxiety, eating problems, 
nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, re-
sentment, guilt, and fearfulness.”48 These psychological and emotional 
problems, in many cases, result in additional issues during adulthood, 
including struggling “with identity issues, personal relationships, and 
possibly [experiencing] problems in parenting their own children.”49 
 IPCA detrimentally affects LBPs as well.50 Emotionally and psycho-
logically, the LBP suffers substantially, experiencing a range of emo-
tions including sadness over the loss of the child (and in some cases, a 
spouse), depression, betrayal, and anger towards the other parent.51 On 
top of these emotional and psychological effects is the helplessness that 
an LBP often experiences when attempting to recover his or her 
child.52 The LBP often does not know where to begin and is over-
whelmed by the complexities of foreign legal systems that may be char-
acterized by cultural differences and foreign languages.53 
 LBPs may also face significant financial hardship as a result of IP-
CA.54 Travel costs to visit abducted children (if permitted by the TP) 
can be substantial or even unaffordable.55 Some LBPs cannot afford the 
considerable expense of hiring an attorney who is familiar with IPCA 
issues, and for those who can afford it, the costs can be great.56 Simi-
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 8. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 8. 
56 Id. David Goldman is acutely aware of the financial hardship imposed by IPCA. See Do-
nations, Bring Sean Home Found., http://bringseanhome.org/wordpress/donations/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Donations, Bring Sean Home Found.]. In the first twelve 
months after Sean’s abduction, Goldman spent nearly $95,000 on legal fees. Dorrit Harazim, 
A Father in a Foreign Land, Piauí Mag., Nov. 2008, available at http://bringseanhome.org/ 
wordpress/goldman-case/newspaper-magazine-articles/a-father-in-a-foreign-land/. By the 
end of the five-year battle to bring Sean home, Goldman had spent over $400,000 on his 
efforts, including a team of both American and Brazilian lawyers and multiple trips to Brazil. 
Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Donations, Bring Sean Home Found., supra. A middle-
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larly, efforts to recover an abducted child often require hiring transla-
tors and interpreters, which can also be costly.57 
 Finally, reunification after abduction can be a difficult experience 
for both abducted children and LBPs.58 The relationship between the 
LBP and the child may have deteriorated, and they may no longer 
share a common language.59 In cases in which the child was removed at 
a young age and the reunion occurs years later, the child may not even 
remember the LBP.60 In many instances, the child will have difficulty 
trusting the LBP and “question why that parent did not try harder to 
get them back.”61 Seeing a child go through this can be very difficult 
for the LBP despite the concurrent happiness over the fact that they 
have been reunited.62 David Goldman experienced such difficulties 
following Sean’s return to New Jersey in December 2009.63 In an inter-
view just days after Sean’s return, David was asked whether he got “the 
feeling that at one moment [Sean] has a warmth toward you and then 
the next . . . he sees you as the enemy?”64 David responded, “[Sean] 
pulls away. Well, [his stepfather and Brazilian relatives] told him I’m 
the enemy for so long, that I’m the bad guy. And I can see he . . . does 
struggle with that.”65 David went on to reflect on Sean’s lack of tears in 
the days since leaving Brazil: 
It would be natural for him to be crying. It would be normal 
for him to be crying. And he’s . . . closed it all in right now. 
There’s got to be pain hidden in there. I hope he can, in a 
very short time, open up to me. And will open up to me in a 
short time. But I’ll be patient.66 
                                                                                                                      
class American, Goldman has been open about the financial strain that he has endured. Ha-
razim, supra; Donations, Bring Sean Home Found., supra. In fact, he has set up a website 
about his story, and that site includes a page through which the public can make donations 
to “defray expenses relating to Sean Goldman’s abduction and repatriation to the United 
States.” Donations, Bring Sean Home Found., supra. 
57 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 8. 
58 Id. at 7. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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 Despite the undeniable negative consequences, IPCA continues to 
increase in frequency.67 In the 2008 fiscal year, OCI was notified of 1082 
IPCA cases involving 1615 children removed from the United States.68 
This was an approximately sixty-nine percent increase over the 2006 
fiscal year, in which 642 cases were reported.69 Similarly, OCI was noti-
fied of 344 cases involving 484 children who were abducted to the 
United States from other countries.70 
II. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction 
 Recognizing the need to protect children and families from IPCA, 
the Hague Conference on Private International Law (the Conference) 
adopted the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction in October 1980.71 The Convention addresses the unique 
legal challenges that LBPs face by virtue of the international nature of 
IPCA.72 Specifically, it establishes standard procedures and obligations 
                                                                                                                      
67 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 6. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22. The Conference is “a global 
inter-governmental organisation” that, as a “melting pot of different legal traditions . . . de-
velops and services multilateral legal instruments, which respond to global needs.” Overview, 
Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display& 
tid=26 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). With nearly seventy countries as members, the Conference 
seeks to address the problems that arise when citizens and businesses of one country are 
affected by and attempt to operate within the legal system of another country. Id. It does so 
by adopting “special rules known as ‘private international law’ rules.” Id. In doing so, the 
Conference aims to meet its statutory mission: “to work for the ‘progressive unification’ of 
these rules” by “finding internationally-agreed [upon] approaches to issues such as jurisdic-
tion of the courts, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in a 
wide range of areas, from commercial law and banking law to international civil procedure 
and from child protection to matters of marriage and personal status.” Id. Thus, the “ulti-
mate goal of the [Conference] is to work for a world in which, despite the differences be-
tween legal systems, persons—individuals as well as companies—can enjoy a high degree of 
legal security.” Id. Since its first meeting in 1893, the Conference has established Conventions 
between nations to reach this goal. Id. There are currently thirty-nine international Conven-
tions in effect. Conventions Listing, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L., http://www.hcch.net/ 
index_en.php?act=conventions.listing (last visited Jan 20, 2011). 
72 See Anne-Marie Hutchinson & Henry Setright, International Parental 
Child Abduction 3 (1998). Hutchinson and Setright commented on the inherent diffi-
culties of IPCA: 
Inevitably, when a child has been abducted internationally, the rights of the 
person from whom the child has been abducted cannot usually be effectively 
enforced in his or her home State. Any effective remedy must be pursued in 
the country in which the child is physically present. It is the diversity of laws 
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for the governments of Contracting States to follow when dealing with 
IPCA cases.73 By providing a civil mechanism by which to ensure the 
safe and prompt return of abducted children, the Convention provides 
much-needed legal recourse to LBPs.74 
A. The Underlying Policy Goals and Objectives 
 The Conference adopted the Convention because it recognized 
“the paramount importance” of the interests of abducted children in 
custody matters.75 Moreover, it recognized the importance of protect-
ing LBPs’ rights of custody and rights of access.76 Thus, the primary 
goal of the Convention is not to resolve custody issues, but rather to 
provide a civil mechanism by which LBPs, whose rights of access or cus-
tody have been violated, can “secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State.”77 This im-
portant distinction is reflected and emphasized throughout the provi-
sions of the Convention—rather than requiring or permitting countries 
to assess the merits of the custody issue (that is, address the best inter-
                                                                                                                      
and legal systems that such a situation produces that has given an impetus to 
the formulation of international conventions in child abduction. 
Id. Additionally, the Convention itself recognizes this inherent difficulty that is attendant 
to the international nature of IPCA; one of the two objects of the Convention is “to ensure 
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively 
respected in the other Contracting States.” International Child Abduction Convention, 
supra note 22, art. 1. 
73 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 6–20. The term Con-
tracting State is used in the Convention to refer to those nations that have agreed to be 
bound by the Convention either through ratification or accession. See id. arts. 37–38. 
74 See id. pmbl. 
75 Id. The preamble to the Convention states: 
The States signatory to the present Convention, Firmly convinced that the in-
terests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their 
custody, Desiring to protect children internationally from the harmful effects 
of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure 
their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to se-
cure protection for rights of access, Have resolved to conclude a Convention 
to this effect . . . . 
Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. pmbl., art. 1; supra note 72. The Convention’s intention is that abducted chil-
dren be returned promptly or, more specifically, within six weeks of the Convention appli-
cation. Id. art. 11; Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 22. 
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ests of the child), the Convention requires that countries act as expedi-
tiously as possible to return the child.78 
 By emphasizing and securing the prompt return of the child to his 
or her country of habitual residence, the Convention aims to protect 
the interests of abducted children and reduce the harmful effects that 
abduction often has on children.79 Moreover, returning the child to his 
or her country of habitual residence protects the interests and rights of 
LBPs by restoring the status quo which existed prior to the abduction, 
thereby providing an opportunity for custody issues to be appropriately 
resolved.80 Restoration of the status quo is often particularly important 
because it strips the TP of any potential jurisdictional advantage gained 
by the abduction with respect to the adjudication of the custody issues.81 
Finally, a central aim of the Convention is to deter abductions and the-
reby protect the best interests of children and the rights of parents.82 
 The Convention also recognizes the importance of acting quickly 
in IPCA cases because delay results in greater harm to abducted chil-
dren and to LBPs’ relationships with their children.83 Thus, a core ob-
jective of the Convention is to establish the most “expeditious” proce-
dures possible by which LBPs can secure the return of their children.84 
B. The Convention in Action: Scope, Obligations, and Procedures 
 Under the terms of the Convention, Contracting States are obli-
gated to follow certain procedures and standards to effect the return of 
a child who has been the subject of “wrongful removal or retention.”85 
The Convention defines a removal or retention of a child as wrongful 
when: 
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an 
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under 
the State in which the child was habitually resident immedi-
ately before the removal or retention; and 
                                                                                                                      
78 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 10–11, 16–17, 19 (“A 
decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be 
a determination on the merits of any custody issue.”). 
79 Buck, supra note 40, at 134; Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1. 
80 Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1. 
81 Id. 
82 Buck, supra note 40, at 134; Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 1. 
83 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 1–3, 11; Buck, supra 
note 40, at 134. 
84 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 2, 11. 
85 Id. arts. 3, 7–20. 
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b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actu-
ally exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so 
exercised but for the removal or retention.86 
The scope of the Convention extends to “any child who was habitually 
resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of cus-
tody or access rights” and it applies until the child reaches sixteen years 
of age.87 
 The Convention mandates that each Contracting State establish a 
“Central Authority” to be responsible for discharging the “duties im-
posed by the Convention.”88 The primary purpose of the Central Au-
thorities is to “co-operate with each other and promote co-operation 
amongst the competent authorities in their respective States to secure 
the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this 
Convention.”89 Their responsibilities include, among other things, to 
take “all appropriate measures” to find abducted children, to prevent 
further harm, to secure the voluntary return of such children, and to 
“initiate or facilitate” judicial or administrative proceedings aimed at 
returning the child to his or her country of habitual residence.90 Addi-
tionally, the Central Authorities are responsible for providing informa-
tion about the child and about the law of their countries, as necessary, 
to assist in securing the child’s return.91 
 Under the Convention, an LBP can apply to either the Central Au-
thority in the country of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central 
Authority of any other Contracting State.92 Once an application is filed, 
                                                                                                                      
86 Id. art. 3. The Convention defines “rights of custody” as “rights relating to the care 
of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of 
residence.” Id. art. 5. The Convention defines “rights of access” as “the right to take a child 
for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.” Id. 
87 Id. art. 4. Thus, the Convention applies in cases in which a child under the age of 
sixteen has been removed from his or her country of habitual residence in breach of rights 
of custody or rights of access of another person (such as the LBP) that were being exer-
cised or attempted to be exercised. Id. arts. 3–4. 
88 Id. art. 6. The Central Authority in the United States is the Department of State and, 
within the Department, the Office of Children’s Issues is responsible for carrying out the 
duties of the Convention. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 
U.S.C. § 11608a (2006); Exec. Order No. 12,648, 3 C.F.R. 579 (1988), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11606 (2006). 
89 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 7. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. art. 8. An applying LBP is required to provide specific information about the 
child, the child’s suspected whereabouts, and the basis of the LBP’s claim. Id. The LBP 
may also include any relevant documents, including copies of judicial decisions or agree-
ments regarding rights of custody or access. Id. 
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the Central Authorities involved are required to seek to obtain the vol-
untary return of the child.93 Because such efforts are often unsuccess-
ful, the Convention also requires that the Central Authorities “initiate 
or facilitate” judicial or administrative proceedings in an effort to se-
cure the child’s return.94 
 Once such judicial or administrative proceedings have been initi-
ated, the judicial or administrative authority in the “requested state” 
must determine whether or not the removal was wrongful under the 
terms of the Convention.95 In making this determination, the authority 
can consider a number of factors, including the laws and decisions of 
the country of habitual residence, any determinations made by the 
country of habitual residence regarding the wrongfulness of the re-
moval or retention, and any determinations about custody issued either 
by the country of habitual residence or by the country to which the 
child was abducted.96 However, prior custody decisions may be consid-
ered only for the limited purpose of “tak[ing] account of the reasons 
for that decision.”97 The Convention clearly states, “The sole fact that a 
decision relating to custody has been given in or is entitled to recogni-
tion in the requested state shall not be a ground for refusing to return 
a child.”98 Similarly, and quite significantly, the Convention proscribes 
the administrative or judicial authority from making any determination 
on the merits of custody rights.99 
 If the authority determines that the removal or retention was 
wrongful, the authority must automatically order the return of the 
child, unless the TP has provided a sufficient defense.100 The Conven-
                                                                                                                      
93 Id. art. 10. This provision is aimed at seeking an “amicable” resolution to the prob-
lem without resorting to judicial order. Nigel Lowe et al., International Movement of 
Children: Law Practice and Procedure 238–39 (2004). The Convention, however, does 
not describe details for how Central Authorities should go about seeking voluntary return. 
Id. at 239; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 10. Con-
sequently, the interpretation and implementation of this provision of the Convention has 
varied from country to country. Lowe et al., supra, at 239. While the Central Authorities 
of some countries will do as much as take an active role in negotiations for the return of 
the child, other countries immediately commence judicial proceedings while possibly mak-
ing “concurrent attempts to bring about a voluntary resolution.” Id. 
94 See International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 7. 
95 Id. arts. 11, 14–18. 
96 Id. arts. 14–15, 17. 
97 Id. art. 17. 
98 Id. 
99 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 16, 19. The Conven-
tion explicitly states, “A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child 
shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” Id. art. 19. 
100 Id. art. 12. 
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tion provides five defenses against automatic return of a wrongfully re-
tained or removed child.101 
 The first defense addresses the time elapsed between the wrongful 
removal or retention and the commencement of the judicial or admin-
istrative proceedings.102 If, at the date of the commencement of the ju-
dicial or administrative proceedings, it has been less than one year 
since the wrongful removal or retention, the authority must order the 
return of the child.103 If, however, more than a year has elapsed, the 
authority is not required to return the child if the TP establishes that 
“the child is now settled in its new environment.”104 
 The second defense addresses the non-exercise of rights by the 
LBP.105 If the TP can prove that the LBP “was not actually exercising the 
custody rights at the time of removal or retention” the requested state is 
not required to order the child’s return.106 Similarly, the third defense 
permits the denial of a return order if the TP demonstrates that the 
LBP “had consented to or subsequently acquiesced to the removal or 
retention.”107 
                                                                                                                      
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 Id. 
104 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 12. The defense im-
poses a two-prong test that requires satisfaction of both prongs—more than a year has 
elapsed and the child is well settled in his or her new environment. See id.; James D. Gar-
bolino, International Child Custody Cases: Handling Hague Convention Cases in 
U.S. Courts 153 (3d ed. 2000). For example, in a 1991 case in New York, fourteen months 
elapsed before the application was made by the LBP; nonetheless, the court denied the 
delay defense because the second prong of the test had not been satisfied. In re David S. v. 
Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Fam. Ct. 1991). The TP failed to provide adequate evi-
dence that the children were well settled, so the court looked to the young age of the chil-
dren—three years old and eighteen months old—to determine that the children were not 
well settled. Id. Because they were so young, the court concluded that the children were 
not yet old enough to have established significant community or social ties such as “mean-
ingful friendships” or “school, extra-curricular, community, religious or social activities.” 
Id. Thus, despite the fact that more than a year had elapsed between the wrongful removal 
and the filing of the Convention application, the court denied the delay defense. Id. 
105 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 13. Under U.S. case 
law, this is a very narrow exception. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1066 (6th Cir. 
1996); see also Garbolino, supra note 104, at 168–69. In Friedrich, the court held: “if a per-
son has valid custody rights to a child under the law of the country of the child’s habitual 
residence, that person cannot fail to ‘exercise’ those custody rights under the Hague Con-
vention short of acts that constitute clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child.” 78 
F.3d at 1066. 
106 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 13. 
107 Id. In Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit laid out a stringent test for determining whether an 
LBP has consented or acquiesced to the removal or retention, stating “we believe that ac-
quiescence under the Convention requires either: an act or statement with the requisite 
formality, such as testimony in a judicial proceeding; a convincing written renunciation of 
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 The fourth defense removes the automatic return obligation if the 
TP can demonstrate that “there is a grave risk that the [child’s] return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation.”108 
 Finally, the fifth exception allows the judicial or administrative au-
thority to “refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the 
child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.”109 
 Thus, if the administrative or judicial authority determines that 
removal or retention was wrongful and that none of the five defenses 
apply, the Convention requires that the child be promptly ordered back 
to his or her country of habitual residence.110 
                                                                                                                      
rights; or a consistent attitude of acquiescence over a significant period of time.” 78 F.3d at 
1070 (footnotes omitted). 
108 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 13. U.S. courts have 
been restrictive in their interpretation of this defense and have generally permitted it in 
two types of situations: (1) where there is “evidence that deals with the inappropriateness 
of the general environment to which the child will be returned”; and (2) where there is 
“evidence that bears on specific dangers which might pose a grave risk to the child.” Gar-
bolino, supra note 104, at 171. For example, U.S. courts have held that the “grave risk” 
must relate not to the “specific home” that the child would be returned to but rather to 
the “general environment in the country” where the child would live. Id. TPs have asserted 
a range of “specific dangers” that could pose a “grave risk” in attempting to establish this 
defense, including domestic violence, neglect or abuse, psychological harm, and exposure 
to a zone of war or disease. Id. at 172–78, 184–85. 
109 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 13. This defense was 
included in the Convention only after significant debate and was included, at least in part, 
because of the Conference’s recognition that “forcible repatriation of those just below the 
age of 16 would have a detrimental effect on the Convention.” Lowe et al., supra note 93, 
at 352–53. Just the same, there was significant concern that such a provision would “make 
the child the ultimate judge of the abduction’s success or failure” and that such discretion 
would unavoidably lead to consideration of the merits of custody, which is inconsistent 
with the Convention’s goals. Id. Additionally, there were concerns that the provision would 
impose far too great a responsibility on young children who are simply incapable of han-
dling such a great psychological burden, particularly in light of the fact that TPs or other 
family members would very likely exert pressure and control over the child. Id. The Con-
vention addresses these concerns by leaving the ultimate decision to return the child with-
in the court’s discretion; objection by the child is not determinative. Id. Indeed, part of the 
judge’s consideration must include a determination of whether or not the child has 
reached an age and level of maturity to enable the child to understand the situation and 
formulate his or her own preferences and objections. Id. at 360–61. Though the Confer-
ence declined to choose a minimum age, records from the drafting sessions indicate that 
those involved generally thought that children under the age of twelve would not normally 
be considered to have reached a sufficient age and level of maturity. Id. Nevertheless, there 
have been cases in which children as young as six and seven have been found to be mature 
enough to have their objections considered. Id. at 361. 
110 See International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 8–20. 
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C. Contracting States and Reciprocity: The Process of Ratification,  
Accession, and Acceptance 
 Reciprocity is a central characteristic of the Convention’s opera-
tion.111 Because the Convention is private law, it is binding only on 
those countries that agree to be bound by it—the Contracting States.112 
For the Convention to apply in a particular case, both the country of 
habitual residence and the country to which the child has been taken 
must be Contracting States; if one is not, the LBP does not have the 
benefit of the Convention.113 Moreover, in some situations the Conven-
tion is not in force between countries even though both are Contract-
ing States.114 
 Countries agree to be bound by the Convention either by ratifica-
tion or accession.115 Under the terms of the Convention, all countries 
that were members of the Conference at the time the Convention was 
originally signed in 1980 are permitted to ratify the Convention.116 By 
ratifying the Convention, a country agrees to be bound by the Conven-
tion.117 Member countries that were not members of the Conference at 
the time the Convention was originally signed are permitted to accede 
to the Convention and thus be legally bound by it.118 
 The important distinction between ratification and accession is 
that ratification automatically puts the Convention into force between 
the ratifying country and all other Contracting States; acceptance does 
                                                                                                                      
111 See id. art. 38; Garbolino, supra note 104, at 21. 
112 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 21; see also International Child Abduction Conven-
tion, supra note 22, arts. 37–38; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210. 
113 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 21; see also International Child Abduction Conven-
tion, supra note 22, arts. 37–38; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210. 
114 See International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 37–38; Gar-
bolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210; infra notes 119–26 
and accompanying text. 
115 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 37–38; Garbolino, 
supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Frequently Asked Questions: 
What Is the Difference Between Signing, Ratifying and Acceding to a Hague Convention?, Hague 
Conf. on Private Int’l L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=faq.details&fid=38 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Hague Conference FAQ]. 
116 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 37; Garbolino, su-
pra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 211. 
117 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 37; Garbolino, su-
pra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Hague Conference FAQ, supra 
note 115. 
118 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 37–38; Garbolino, 
supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; see also Hague Conference 
FAQ, supra note 115. 
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not play a role in ratification.119 When a country accedes to the Con-
vention, however, the Convention does not automatically enter into 
force between the acceding country and the other Contracting States; 
rather, the accession is subject to acceptance by the other Contracting 
States.120 The other Contracting States are permitted to either accept or 
not accept that country’s accession.121 If the Contracting State expressly 
accepts the acceding country, the Convention enters into force be-
tween those two countries.122 If the Contracting State chooses not to 
accept the acceding country, the Convention does not enter into force 
between those two countries.123 
 The decision whether or not to accept an acceding country is 
based primarily on the Contracting State’s perception of the acceding 
country’s ability to implement the provisions and fulfill the obligations 
of the Convention.124 The central concern is, of course, the ability of 
the acceding country to meet its obligations of reciprocity.125 If a Con-
tracting State believes the acceding country is unlikely to adequately 
implement and comply with the Convention, the Contracting State will 
likely choose not to accept the acceding country, thereby avoiding the 
obligations that come with reciprocity.126 
 When the Convention was originally signed in 1980, only four 
countries immediately signed.127 By 1990, still only twelve countries had 
ratified and two countries had acceded.128 Since then, there has been 
significant increase in participation in the Convention.129 Today, there 
are more than eighty Contracting States, prompting the Conference to 
                                                                                                                      
119 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11. 
120 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Hague 
Conference FAQ, supra note 115; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra 
note 22, art. 38. 
121 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Hague 
Conference FAQ, supra note 115; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra 
note 22, art. 38. 
122 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Hague 
Conference FAQ, supra note 115; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra 
note 22, art. 38. 
123 Garbolino, supra note 104, at 23–24; Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 210–11; Hague 
Conference FAQ, supra note 115; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra 
note 22, art. 38. 
124 See Garbolino, supra note 104, at 25; Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 31. 
125 See Garbolino, supra note 104, at 25; Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 31. 
126 See Garbolino, supra note 104, at 25; Walsh & Savard, supra note 17, at 31. 
127 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 23. 
128 Lowe et al., supra note 93, at 211. 
129 See id.; Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 3. 
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tout it as “one of the most successful family law instruments to be com-
pleted under the auspices of the [Conference].”130 
 The United States signed the Convention on December 23, 1981 
and ratified it on November 10, 1986.131 The Convention went into 
force for the United States on July 1, 1988.132 In order to implement 
the Convention, Congress adopted the International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act (ICARA), which provides the necessary legislative provi-
sions to ensure that the Convention is properly implemented and that 
its obligations are fulfilled in the United States.133 
III. The Problem of Noncompliant Contracting States 
A. The Critical Role of Noncompliance in the Goldman Case 
 David Goldman’s son was taken to Brazil on June 16, 2004.134 Sean 
did not return to New Jersey until December 31, 2009—more than five 
years later.135 During those five long years, David fought for his son every 
                                                                                                                      
130 Convention Outline, supra note 27, at 3. The Conference website provides the most up-
to-date list of Contracting States as well as detailed information about their ratification, acces-
sion and acceptance statuses. See Contracting States Chart, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L., 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/abductoverview_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). Additionally, 
it is important to note that while there has been significant success in securing ratification of 
and accession to the Convention, increased membership is still an important goal because 
abductions involving non-party countries “account for nearly half of parental child abduc-
tions and result in the fewest returns.” McCue, supra note 24, at 106–07; see also Laura C. 
Clemens, Note, International Parental Child Abduction: Time for the United States to Take a Stand, 
30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 151, 166–68 (2003); Report on Compliance with the Hague Con-
vention, supra note 21, at 37. In particular, Japan has become the target of increasing criticism 
and pressure in light of its failure to sign the Convention. See, e.g., Press Release, Ambassadors 
of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, Joint Statement on International Child Abduction (Oct. 16, 2009), http://tokyo. 
usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20091016-78.html [hereinafter Joint Statement] (“Japan is the only G-
7 nation that has not signed the Convention. The [LBPs] of children abducted to or from 
Japan have little realistic hope of having their children returned . . . .”); Malcolm Foster, U.S. 
Warns Japan Child Custody Laws Could Harm Ties, ABC News, Feb. 2, 2010, http://abc 
news.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9723898; Michael Inbar, Dad in Japan Custody Case: 
I’m Dead to My Kids, TodayShow.com (Nov. 9, 2009), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
33788543. In addition to growing media attention in response to the many cases of IPCA to 
Japan, Japan has become the target of increasing political pressure. See Joint Statement, supra; 
Foster, supra; Inbar, supra. 
131 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, presidential proclama-
tion. 
132 Id. 
133 See ICARA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006). 
134 Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, 
supra note 9. 
135 See Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3. 
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day, enduring a difficult and exhausting legal battle.136 As soon as it had 
become clear that his wife would not voluntarily return Sean, David re-
tained a lawyer in the United States.137 When presented with the facts of 
the case, the lawyer was confident that it would be an “open and shut” 
case and that Sean “would be immediately returned” because Brazil was 
a Contracting State.138 It ended up being not nearly that simple.139 
 On August 26, 2004, a New Jersey court held that Sean’s removal 
was wrongful under the Convention and that the United States was 
Sean’s country of habitual residence.140 The New Jersey court issued an 
order that Sean immediately be returned to New Jersey.141 Bruna 
Goldman ignored the order.142 On September 3, 2004, David reported 
the removal to the U.S. State Department (the U.S. Central Authority) 
thereby initiating Hague proceedings.143 In October 2004, David, grow-
ing anxious to expedite the process, hired Brazilian attorneys and, on 
November 16, 2004, initiated Hague proceedings in the federal courts 
in Rio de Janeiro.144 Without regard to the Hague mandate that judicial 
authorities proceed as expeditiously as possible, the federal court in 
Brazil acted with significant delay.145 By May 2005, the case was still 
pending, and Bruna successfully delayed the proceedings further by 
filing a motion to contest the competence of the Brazilian federal 
court, effectively “paralyzing” the federal court.146 This paralysis con-
tinued until September 21, 2005, when the competence of the federal 
court was confirmed.147 
                                                                                                                      
136 See id.; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. 
137 See Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-
Old, supra note 9. 
138 Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. 
139 See Christopher H. Smith, Will Brazil Do the Right Thing?: American Boy Held There By 
Stepdad After Mother Dies, Wash. Times, June 19, 2009, at A19; Dateline: Bring Sean Home, 
supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. 
140 Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints at 3, Goldman v. Goldman, No. 
FD-13–395–05C (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 26, 2004). 
141 Id. 
142 Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., Attorney for David Goldman, to National Council 
for the Rights of Children and Adolescents (Mar. 16, 2009), http://bringseanhome.org/word 
press/goldman-case/the-american-by-joao-paulo-lins-e-silva/reply-by-ricardo-zamariola/ [here-
inafter Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr.]. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id.; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 11. 
146 Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., supra note 142. 
147 Id. 
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 Subsequently, the Hague proceedings continued, and on October 
13, 2005, a decision was finally rendered.148 Devastatingly, the court de-
termined that, indeed, Sean had been wrongfully removed from the 
United States under the terms of the Convention, but the court, in vio-
lation of the Convention, refused to order Sean’s return on the ground 
that too much time had passed and Sean was settled with his mother.149 
The federal court’s refusal to return Sean was in direct noncompliance 
with the requirements of the Convention.150 Under Article 12 of the 
Convention, if proceedings before a judicial authority are commenced 
within one year of a wrongful removal, the judicial authority “shall or-
der the return of the child.”151 Whether or not to return the child sim-
ply was not a determination within the court’s discretion.152 The Brazil-
ian court, however, disregarded this obligation; instead, it acted in 
accordance with the Brazilian judiciary’s tendency to favor mothers 
over fathers in custody proceedings, and it did so despite the fact that 
Hague proceedings are not supposed to be treated as custody mat-
ters.153 
 David immediately appealed the decision, but his nightmare only 
grew in the months and years that followed.154 As he navigated through 
the appeals process to the Superior Court of Justice and later to the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, the Goldman case took many twists 
and turns, most of which were for the worse.155 The appeals process 
                                                                                                                      
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id.; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 11–12. 
151 International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 12; supra note 104 
and accompanying text. 
152 See International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 12; supra note 
104 and accompanying text. 
153 See International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, arts. 11–12, 16; Report 
on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 17; Letter from Ricardo Zamari-
ola Jr., supra note 142. 
154 Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., supra note 142; see also Dateline: Bring Sean Home, 
supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. 
155 See Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., supra note 142; see also Dateline: Bring Sean 
Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. Specifically, 
Bruna was awarded custody by a Brazilian court, she obtained a divorce from David in 
Brazil without his knowledge or presence, and she married Joao Paulo Bagueira Leal Lins 
e Silva, a Brazilian attorney who specializes in IPCA. Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., 
supra note 142; Dateline: Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; David’s Story, supra note 1. Then in 
August 2008, Bruna died giving birth to a child with her new husband. David’s Story, supra 
note 1. Instead of being awarded immediate custody in light of the fact he was Sean’s only 
remaining biological parent, Goldman was forced into a legal battle with Bruna’s widower. 
See Letter from Ricardo Zamariola Jr., supra note 142. In the wake of Bruna’s death, Lins e 
Silva launched a relentless battle to keep Sean with him in Brazil and took arguably uncon-
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finally ended on December 22, 2009, when the Brazilian Supreme 
Court ordered that Sean be returned to his father.156 This successful 
outcome, however, did not come without great effort and political pres-
sure.157 During the course of his legal battle, Goldman made fifteen 
trips to Brazil.158 He hired a legal team of American and Brazilian at-
torneys.159 He incurred costs of more than $400,000.160 He started a 
website and gathered a group of supporters.161 He received significant 
public assistance and support from the American media, U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, and President Barack Obama.162 He worked 
directly with U.S. Representative Chris Smith for nearly all of 2009, and 
Representative Smith accompanied David to Brazil and garnered sup-
port for the Goldman case in the U.S. Congress.163 At Representative 
Smith’s urging, both the House and the Senate passed resolutions in 
2009 calling for Brazil to comply with the Hague Convention and re-
turn Sean to the United States.164 An incredible amount of effort from 
countless people was necessary to secure Sean’s return to the United 
States.165 Certainly, this was not what the drafters of the Convention en-
visioned; needless to say, much went very wrong.166 
                                                                                                                      
scionable measures in doing so. See id. Instead of filing for custody of Sean following 
Bruna’s death, Lins e Silva attempted to have David’s name removed from Sean’s birth 
certificate and replaced with his own. Id. He publicly discredited David’s reputation as a 
father and husband and made false statements in doing so. Id. He failed to comply with 
Brazilian orders awarding David visitation with Sean in Brazil, effectively seeking to inter-
fere with and inhibit any relationship between David and his son. Id. Lins e Silva also 
sought significant delays in court proceedings. Id. 
156 Daniel B. Wood, Brazil Custody Case: David Goldman Gets Custody of Son Sean, Chris-
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157 See, e.g., S. Res. 37, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted); H. R. Res. 125, 111th Cong. 
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(last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
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national law.”). 
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164 See S. Res. 37, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted); H. R. Res. 125, 111th Cong. (2009) 
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 Unfortunately for David, Sean was abducted to one of seven coun-
tries that the U.S. Department of State has noted for demonstrating 
“patterns of non-compliance” with the Convention.167 The legal battle 
that Goldman endured was the result of the Brazilian government’s 
failure to comply with the mandates of the Convention.168 
B. Countries That Fail to Comply: Rates, Ways, and Consequences 
 Pursuant to § 11611 of ICARA, the Department of State is required 
to provide an annual report on Contracting States that fail to comply 
with the Convention.169 This annual report provides information about 
“countries in which implementation of the Convention is incomplete or 
in which a particular country’s executive, judicial, or law enforcement 
authorities do not properly apply the Convention’s requirements.”170 In 
making its assessments, the Department considers “systemic patterns” in 
Contracting States, and it bases its analysis primarily on the standards 
and practices in the Guide to Good Practice issued by the Permanent Bu-
reau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.171 Addi-
tionally, the Department’s analysis focuses on three compliance areas: 
(1) Central Authority performance; (2) judicial performance; and (3) 
law enforcement performance.172 Based on this analysis, the Depart-
ment places the appropriate countries in one of two categories: “Coun-
tries Not Compliant with the Convention” and “Countries Demonstrat-
ing Patterns of Noncompliance” with the Convention.173 For a country 
to be “not compliant,” it must be failing in all three performance ar-
                                                                                                                      
167 See Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 13. 
168 See id. at 16–17. 
169 ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11611 (2006). 
170 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 12. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. The Central Authority analysis assesses issues such as speed of application proc-
ess, “the existence of and adherence to procedures for assisting LBPs in locating knowl-
edgeable, affordable legal assistance,” and “responsiveness to inquiries made by [the U.S. 
Central Authority] and LBPs.” Id. It also includes an assessment of the programs and re-
sources for judicial education about the Convention. Id. The “judicial performance” analy-
sis addresses the issues of timeliness and expeditiousness of the country’s court system in 
processing Convention applications and appeals, how well the courts apply the Conven-
tion’s legal mandates, and the efforts made by the court system to enforce return or access 
decisions. Id. Finally, the “law enforcement performance” analysis addresses how successful 
law enforcement in the country is at quickly locating abducted children as well as how 
successful it is at enforcing court orders. Id. 
173 Id. 
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eas.174 For a country to be “demonstrating patterns of noncompliance” 
it must be failing in one or two of the performance areas.175 
 The Department’s 2008 report indicates that Honduras is the only 
nation in the “not compliant” category, and that seven other countries 
demonstrate “patterns of noncompliance:” Brazil, Chile, Greece, Mex-
ico, Slovakia, Switzerland, and Venezuela.176 There are many ways in 
which these countries fail to comply with the Convention, and there is 
often overlap among the countries.177 For example, five of the seven 
countries frequently treat Convention cases as custody cases.178 Despite 
the fact that the Convention clearly states that custody issues are not to 
be determined in Convention proceedings, these countries continue to 
make such determinations based on “best interests” types of analysis.179 
 Similarly, all but one of the seven countries were found to have 
court systems that have unacceptable delays in Convention proceed-
ings.180 This is particularly problematic because such delays often have 
detrimental effects on the LBP’s ability to secure the child’s return.181 
For example, the Chilean court system fails to handle Convention ap-
plications in the expeditious manner mandated by the Convention; 
consequently, Chile has a notable trend for refusing to return children 
because they are “settled” in the new country.182 Such determinations 
could be avoided if the cases were dealt with in the prompt manner 
required by the Convention because children would not have the time 
necessary to “settle.”183 
                                                                                                                      
174 Id. 
175 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 12. 
176 Id. at 13. 
177 Id. at 15–25. 
178 Id. at 17–18, 21, 23, 25. 
179 Id.; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 16. 
180 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 15–23. 
181 Id. at 18, 21–22 (“[W]hen a lengthy court process enables a court to deny a child’s 
return to his country of habitual residence, the principles of the Convention are not satis-
fied.”). 
182 Id. at 18. 
183 See id. Another example of the detrimental effect of delays is provided by a case in 
which a child was wrongfully removed to Slovakia. Id. at 22. There, the initial hearing was 
not conducted until eight months after the removal. Id. The court ordered the return of 
the child, and the TP appealed twice. Id. The first appeal, in which the original decision 
was affirmed, was not heard until nine months after the original decision. Id. The second 
appeal was not heard until eight months after the first appellate decision and, as a conse-
quence of the delay, resulted in the original decision being overturned. Id. In the second 
appeal, the court determined that it would consider the child’s preferences because he 
had reached sufficient “age and degree of maturity” as required by the Convention. Id. 
Had the delays not occurred, this would not have happened. Id. at 12. 
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 In addition to treating Convention cases as custody cases and im-
posing prohibited delays, several of the seven countries have displayed 
trends of biases.184 Such biases include favoring native TPs over the for-
eign LBP and favoring mothers over fathers.185 In fact, the highest court 
in Switzerland, in upholding a lower court’s refusal to return a child to 
the United States, justified its decision by noting the “special relation-
ship” between children and their mothers.186 The Department of State 
disapproved of this justification in its annual compliance report.187 
 Other forms of noncompliance cited by the Department include 
failure by law enforcement to enforce return or visitation orders 
promptly and effectively; lack of Central Authority assistance to LBPs; 
lack of communication between foreign Central Authorities and the 
U.S. Central Authority; and inadequate resources allocated to locating 
abducted children.188 
 In Brazil, the trends of noncompliance are significant and had a 
direct impact on the Goldman case.189 The U.S. Department of State 
categorized Brazil as demonstrating patterns of noncompliance be-
cause of failures in both judicial performance and Central Authority 
performance.190 Specifically, Brazil has a serious backlog of cases be-
cause of the Central Authority’s failure to allocate adequate public 
prosecutors to assist with LBPs’ applications.191 Consequently, the Bra-
zilian Central Authority advises LBPs to hire private attorneys, but once 
they do so, the Brazilian Central Authority discontinues its involvement 
in and monitoring of the case.192 This leaves the LBPs without the sup-
port and assistance that the Convention intends Central Authorities to 
provide.193 Additionally, the Brazilian courts have demonstrated a trend 
of treating Convention cases as custody cases and, as a result, often re-
fuse to issue return orders because the child has adapted to Brazilian 
culture.194 The court system also has displayed notable delays in proc-
essing cases, and the courts “exhibit widespread patterns of bias to-
                                                                                                                      
184 Id. at 17–18, 23. 
185 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 17–18, 23. 
186 Id. at 23. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 16, 21, 23, 25. 
189 See id. at 16–17, 44; see also Aronson, supra note 9; Smith, supra note 139; Dateline: 
Bring Sean Home, supra note 3; Larry King Live: Tug of War Over 8-Year-Old, supra note 9. 
190 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 16. 
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193 See id.; see also International Child Abduction Convention, supra note 22, art. 7. 
194 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 16–17. 
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wards Brazilian mothers.”195 Indeed, the Goldman case was affected by 
most, if not all, of these patterns of noncompliance.196 
IV. The Need for a Mechanism for Addressing Noncompliance 
and a Possible Solution 
A. The Convention’s Major Shortcoming: The Lack of a Mechanism for 
Addressing Noncompliance 
 With the existence and extent of noncompliance understood, the 
logical next question is “Why is this allowed to happen?”197 The answer 
is simple: the Convention does not provide a mechanism for ensuring 
that Contracting States fulfill their obligations or for dealing with those 
Contracting States that fail to do so.198 Professors Paul Beaumont and 
Peter McEleavy summed it up well: “Faced with sustained non-com-
pliance there is little Contracting States can do; certainly there is no me-
chanism proscribed within the text of the Convention. . . . Ultimately, in 
the absence of any sanction the operation of the Convention depends 
upon the goodwill of the signatory States.”199 Thus, noncompliance oc-
curs with few ramifications for noncompliant countries.200 
 The very existence of the Department of State’s annual noncom-
pliance report demonstrates that noncompliance is an important issue 
that demands attention.201 In fact, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Consular Affairs Janice L. Jacobs highlighted this in the report’s intro-
ductory letter: 
Compliance with the Convention is an ongoing challenge; 
continuing evaluation of treaty implementation in partner 
countries and in the United States is vital for its success. Very 
few options exist for parents and children who are victims of 
parental child abduction. As the U.S. Central Authority for this 
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196 See id. at 16–17, 44; see also Aronson, supra note 9; Smith, supra note 139; Dateline: 
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199 Beaumont & McEleavy, supra note 27, at 242. 
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important Convention, the Office of Children’s Issues . . . will 
continue to work with each of our Convention partners to re-
solve abduction cases promptly and to improve understanding 
and full and complete implementation of the Convention.202 
 In that spirit, the U.S. Department of State has taken some action 
to help strengthen the implementation of the Convention in Contract-
ing States.203 For example, the Department worked with the U.S. Em-
bassy in Mexico City to persuade the Mexican government to increase 
its efforts to locate abducted children.204 Similarly, the Department par-
ticipated in meetings between Latin American Contracting States and 
the Conference to help strengthen the operation of the Convention in 
Central and South America.205 These efforts included taking part in 
conferences in Buenos Aires which were “aimed at training judges, 
drawing up model implementing legislation, and developing programs 
to improve Convention performance.”206 More generally, the Depart-
ment stays actively abreast of the improvement measures being taken in 
countries that have demonstrated patterns of noncompliance, and the 
Department pursues coordination and communication with the Cen-
tral Authorities of those countries.207 
 These relatively gentle measures, however, simply are not enough 
to address the extreme noncompliance that exists.208 Rather, stronger, 
more assertive action must be taken.209 U.S. Representative Chris Smith 
made this observation in the context of the Goldman case, in which he 
played a critical role in ensuring Sean’s return.210 Representative Smith 
made the following statement not only about Brazil’s noncompliance 
but also about Convention noncompliance more generally: 
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203 Id. at 2, 16–25, 37–38. 
204 Id. at 21. 
205 Id. at 37. 
206 Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention, supra note 21, at 37. 
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208 See id. at 16–25, 37–38; see also Aronson, supra note 9; Smith, supra note 139; Christo-
pher H. Smith, Excerpt from International Child Abduction Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human 
Rights Commission, Chris Smith, 1 (Dec. 2, 2009), http://chrissmith.house.gov/Uploaded 
Files/CHS_Testimony_on_Goldman_Hearing.pdf (“[IPCA] trends show no sign of abate-
ment or reversal until serious, aggressive, robust and sustained actions are implemented.”). 
209 See Smith, supra note 139; Smith, supra note 208, at 1–4; see also Aronson, supra note 9. 
210 See Smith, supra note 139. See generally International Child Abduction Prevention 
Act of 2009, H.R. 3240, 111th Cong. (2009); Suspend Brazil GSP Act, H.R. 2702, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
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From my work as author of numerous human rights laws, . . . I 
have learned that offending countries are far likelier to take 
human rights abuse seriously if a predictable, hefty penalty 
awaits indifference or noncompliance. Moral suasion occa-
sionally succeeds but far too often is ignored. The bottom line 
is that the [Brazilian] government and some other govern-
ments are ignoring their commitments under the Hague Con-
vention. Many American families are being severely hurt, and 
the State Department and Congress need to urgently turn our 
attention to the matter, and address it head-on.211 
 In response to the Goldman case, Representative Smith introduced 
two significant bills aimed at addressing Convention noncompliance.212 
The first, House Bill 2702 (HB 2702), was introduced during the Gold-
man litigation and is aimed at pressuring Brazil to comply with the Con-
vention.213 The second bill, House Bill 3240 (HB 3240) was also intro-
duced during the Goldman litigation, but it is aimed more broadly at 
addressing international child abduction generally, including Conven-
tion noncompliance.214 Both bills provide the type of “predictable, hefty 
penalty” that is necessary to resolve the noncompliance issue and HB 
3240, in particular, provides a real promise of hope for the future.215 
B. United States House Bill 2702 
 Representative Smith introduced HB 2702 in the House on June 4, 
2009, with the dual goals of resolving the Goldman case and securing 
the return of “all children to the United States who are being held 
wrongfully in Brazil in contravention of the Hague Convention.”216 The 
bill imposes sanctions on Brazil by “suspend[ing] the application of the 
Generalized System of Preferences for Brazil” until Brazil’s Central Au-
thority, judicial system, and law enforcement system comply with the 
Convention in all IPCA cases that involve children from the United 
States.217 
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 Representative Smith provided support for this bill by stating, “Our 
country has extended these duty-free benefits to help Brazil economi-
cally. But if Brazil does not live up to its treaty obligations—at least 65 
American children remain abducted in Brazil—something more than 
diplomatic chatter should underscore our resolve.”218 These economic 
sanctions are that “something more.”219 
 Suspending the benefits of the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) has proven to be an effective way of incentivizing changes in be-
havior and policy in developing countries; thus, HB 2702 has the po-
tential to incentivize the Brazilian government to take its Convention 
obligations more seriously and to take the steps necessary to come into 
full compliance with the Convention.220 Suspension can have an incen-
tivizing effect because GSP benefits provide important, immediate eco-
                                                                                                                      
ports.” See William H. Cooper, Cong. Research Serv., Order Code 97-389, General-
ized System of Preferences 1 (2006), available at http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/ 
assets/crs/97-389.pdf. The GSP seeks to achieve this goal by “providing preferential duty-
free entry for about 4,800 products from 131 designated beneficiary countries and territo-
ries.” Generalized System of Preference (GSP), Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized-
system-preference-gsp (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). Brazil is among the developing nations 
that receive the duty-free benefits this program provides. H.R. 2702 § 2(a)(10). 
218 Smith, supra note 139. 
219 See H.R. 2702; Smith, supra note 139. 
220 See Cooper, supra note 217, at 3 (”[T]he threat of losing benefits sometimes per-
suades beneficiary countries to change objectionable policies or practices.”); Lance Compa & 
Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 Comp. 
Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 199, 209 (2001); USTR Reinstates Generalized System of Preferences Benefits for 
Ukraine, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-
development/preference-programs/generalized-system-preferences-gsp/gsp-documents-4 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Ukraine Reinstatement]. For example, in 2001, the 
USTR suspended Ukraine’s GSP benefits and shortly thereafter imposed 100% tariff sanc-
tions on Ukraine because Ukraine was the greatest producer and exporter of pirated DVDs 
and CDs. Ukraine Reinstatement, supra. These sanctions were imposed in an effort to pressure 
Ukraine to address this issue. See id. After the Ukrainian government successfully passed legis-
lation aimed at addressing the piracy issues, the tariff sanctions were lifted in 2005 but the 
GSP suspension continued in effect. Id. Ukraine continued to take steps at monitoring the 
piracy issues and enforcing the laws aimed at curbing piracy. Id. In light of Ukraine’s im-
provements in “the enforcement and protection of intellectual property rights,” the USTR 
reinstated Ukraine’s GSP benefits in 2009. Id. This demonstrates the incentivizing potential 
of suspension of GSP benefits. See id. Suspension of GSP benefits has played a similar role in 
improving the labor policy and labor rights in developing countries. Compa & Vogt, supra, at 
209. In 1984, Congress passed legislation that linked a developing country’s eligibility for 
GSP benefits to whether the country was “taking steps to afford internationally recognized 
worker rights.” 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (2006). As a result, within seventeen years, thir-
teen countries had been suspended from the GSP program, prompting several to take the 
necessary steps to reform their labor policy to meet the new GSP requirements and success-
fully regain GSP benefits. Compa & Vogt, supra, at 209. Again, this demonstrates the incentiv-
izing power of suspending the economic benefits of GSP. See id. 
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nomic support by increasing export potential and thus providing for 
economic growth.221 Perhaps even more significantly, a developing 
country’s eligibility for GSP benefits sends important signals about the 
country to members of the U.S. market with whom private companies 
in developing countries seek to do business.222 Put simply, “[l]oss of 
GSP beneficiary status sends . . . a strong signal that a country is poten-
tially bad business.”223 Consequently, removing that status can provide a 
significant incentive to take the actions necessary to get the status rein-
stated.224 
 That HB 2702 was originally directed, in large part, at the now-
resolved Goldman case does not render the bill ineffective.225 Rather, 
the bill would impose GSP suspension regardless, and would reinstate 
GSP benefits only when Brazil’s Central Authority, judicial system and 
law enforcement system are “complying with [their] obligations under 
the Hague Convention with respect to international child abduction 
cases involving children from the United States” —not just with respect 
to Sean Goldman.226 
 Just the same, noncompliance is not just a Brazilian problem; ra-
ther, six other countries have demonstrated patterns of noncompliance 
and one country has been deemed entirely noncompliant.227 HB 2702 
would not address this larger problem.228 As a result, Congress’ efforts 
would be put to better use in giving serious consideration to the more 
comprehensive HB 3240, which is aimed at addressing all Convention 
noncompliance, regardless of the country, as well as making improve-
ments to how IPCA is addressed more generally.229 
C. United States House Bill 3240 
 Unlike HB 2702, HB 3240 takes a comprehensive approach to im-
proving how international child abductions (ICA) are addressed in the 
United States and around the world; thus, while its goals include ad-
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158 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 31:129 
dressing Convention noncompliance, they are also much broader.230 
The purposes of the bill include protecting the rights of children; assist-
ing parents and providing them with the tools necessary to resolve ICA 
cases; promoting an international consensus that custody issues should 
be resolved in a child’s country of habitual residence; and “facili-
tat[ing] the creation and effective implementation of international 
mechanisms, particularly the [Convention], to protect children from 
the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention.”231 Because 
HB 3240 provides a realistic and aggressive approach to addressing the 
growing problem of IPCA, Congress should seriously consider this im-
portant legislation.232 
 House Bill 3240 would do two major things: (1) establish an Office 
on International Child Abductions (OICA), headed by an Ambassador 
at Large for International Child Abductions (AAL), within the De-
partment of State, and (2) provide an integral role for the President, 
along with the Department of State, to designate countries as “engaged 
in a pattern of noncooperation” with respect to ICA and to impose pu-
nitive actions and sanctions on those countries.233 
 The AAL, as head of OICA, would be completely dedicated to ad-
dressing ICA.234 The AAL would have a range of responsibilities includ-
ing advocating for abducted children, assisting LBPs, promoting meas-
ures aimed at preventing ICA, and seeking to “advance mechanisms to 
prevent and resolve cases of [ICA] abroad.”235 Additionally, the AAL 
would be a principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of State 
regarding ICA and would make recommendations regarding how best 
to address ICA.236 The AAL would also play an important diplomatic 
role in improving how ICA is addressed in other countries and in secur-
ing the resolution of specific ICA cases.237 
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 The AAL, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, would be re-
sponsible for producing an Annual Report on International Child Ab-
duction (“the Annual Report”) which would ultimately replace the cur-
rent report on noncompliance that is produced by OCI.238 This report 
would provide much more information than the current annual non-
compliance report does.239 Instead of providing information about ICA 
cases only in those countries that are Contracting States of the Conven-
tion, the Annual Report would provide information about all relevant 
countries (those that are involved in ICA cases), designating them as 
“Hague Convention Signatory Countries,” “MOU Countries,” or “Non-
signatory Countries.”240 The annual report would require a list of all 
pending cases in all countries and specific details about the cases, in-
cluding what is being done to resolve each case.241 For MOU countries, 
it would provide not only a description about the elements of the MOU 
but also information about whether the MOU country is moving toward 
accession to the Convention.242 Similarly, for nonsignatory countries, it 
would provide “[i]nformation on efforts by the Department of State to 
encourage each such nonsignatory country to become a Hague Con-
vention signatory country or MOU country.”243 The report would also 
include additional information aimed at identifying the nature of the 
ICA problem, including information about the number of military fami-
lies affected, information about the use of airlines in ICA and recom-
mendations for best airline practices, and information about steps taken 
by the United States to train domestic and foreign judges on the appli-
cation of the Convention.244 Thus, unlike the current noncompliance 
report, the Annual Report would be broader in focus and targeted not 
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only at noncompliance issues but also at ICA and IPCA more gener-
ally.245 
 The other major component of HB 3240 is the power and respon-
sibility that it affords the President in addressing not only countries that 
fail to comply with the Convention but also those MOU and Nonsigna-
tory Countries that fail to cooperate in resolving ICA cases.246 Specifi-
cally, the bill would require the President to make an annual review of 
the unresolved ICA cases in each foreign country and from that review 
designate countries as demonstrating “patterns of noncooperation.”247 
This categorization would apply to those countries that have demon-
strated a “systemic failure” with respect to resolving ICA cases, includ-
ing but not limited to countries that are Contracting States.248 
 Then, in consultation with each noncooperative country, the LBPs, 
and any other interested U.S. parties, the President would determine 
the appropriate action to address the noncooperation.249 Ideally, the 
President would attempt to resolve the pattern of noncooperation 
through “noneconomic policy options,” but once those have been ex-
hausted, it would be the President’s responsibility to take any of the 
eighteen listed actions, or other commensurate action as substituted by 
the President, to address the noncooperation.250 These actions range 
from “private demarche” and “public condemnation” to serious eco-
nomic sanctions including suspension of GSP benefits, limitations on 
export licenses, and prohibition from accessing loans and financial 
credit opportunities from U.S. financial institutions.251 Such presiden-
tial actions would remain in effect until waived by the President once 
the President has determined that the sanctioned country “has satisfac-
torily resolved the unresolved cases giving rise to the application of 
such actions” and the country has addressed its pattern of noncoopera-
tion to ensure it will effectively address ICA cases in the future.252 Thus, 
HB 2702 has the potential to incentivize Convention compliance, but 
                                                                                                                      
245 Compare ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11611(2006) (listing the information required to be 
included in the Central Authority’s annual report on noncompliance), with H.R. 3240 
(listing the information that would be required in the Annual Report on International 
Child Abduction). 
246 See H.R. 3240 §§ 201–202. 
247 Id. § 20(b)(1)(A). 
248 See id. § 3(12). 
249 See id. §§ 202(c)–(d), 204(a). 
250 See id. §§ 202(c), 203(5), 204(a)–(b). 
251 H.R. 3240 § 204(a) (listing eighteen possible actions). 
252 Id. § 206(a) (listing specific requirements for Hague Convention Signatory Coun-
tries, MOU Countries, and Nonsignatory Countries). 
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HB 3240 has the potential to incentivize compliance while also improv-
ing IPCA resolutions in Nonsignatory and MOU countries.253 This is 
the precise type of pressure that is necessary to ensure that IPCA cases 
are properly resolved.254 
 Thus, HB 3240 has the potential to provide the mechanism for en-
suring compliance that the Convention currently lacks.255 It also has the 
potential to further address the growing problem of IPCA.256 The latest 
major action taken on HB 3240, however, was assignment to a subcom-
mittee on September 14, 2009.257 It currently sits in five House commit-
tees and two subcommittees.258 It is essential that this bill, and the hope 
that it provides, not be lost to the legislative process.259 It must not meet 
the fate of most bills introduced in Congress: it must not die in commit-
tee.260 Rather, the committees to which this bill has been assigned must 
push it through the legislative process and give it the consideration it 
deserves.261 They must make it the best piece of legislation possible and 
see it through to the White House.262 In doing so, Congress will improve 
Convention compliance and implementation around the world.263 
                                                                                                                      
253 See id. §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; supra notes 219–223 and accompa-
nying text. 
254 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; supra notes 219–223 and ac-
companying text. 
255 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; supra notes 219–223 and ac-
companying text. 
256 See supra notes 229–231 and accompanying text. See generally H.R. 3240 (aimed at 
addressing international child abduction generally while also addressing Convention non-
compliance). 
257 H.R. 3240, The Library of Congress: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov (Under 
“Search Bill Summary & Status,” select “Bill Number” and search for H.R. 3240) (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011) (indicating that the latest major action on the bill was referral to subcommit-
tee). 
258 Id. 
259 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; supra notes 219–223 and ac-
companying text. 
260 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; Legislative Process, CQ—Roll 
Call Group, http://corporate.cq.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=231 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) 
[hereinafter Legislative Process] (“Most bills simply die in committee.”); supra notes 219–223 
and accompanying text. For example, of the more than 9000 bills and joint resolutions in-
troduced in the 107th Congress (2001–2003), only 377 were enacted into law. Legislative Proc-
ess, supra. 
261 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; Legislative Process, supra note 
260; supra notes 219–223 and accompanying text. 
262 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; Legislative Process, supra note 
260; supra notes 219–223 and accompanying text. 
263 See H.R. 3240 §§ 204(a), 206(a); Smith, supra note 139; supra notes 219–223 and ac-
companying text. 
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Conclusion 
 On December 31, 2009—more than five years after being taken to 
Brazil—Sean Goldman returned home to New Jersey with his father. 
Though it was a moment for celebration after a long-fought legal bat-
tle, Sean’s return highlighted the damage that the abduction had done 
to his relationship with his father and the repair that would have to take 
place going forward. Yet, despite their lost time together and the work 
ahead, Sean and David are lucky: they, unlike so many families affected 
by IPCA in noncompliant countries, defied the odds. International pa-
rental child abduction is a devastating and tragic phenomenon, but 
what is more tragic are the cases that remain unresolved due to Con-
vention noncompliance. The value of the Convention is great, but that 
value is severely undermined in noncompliant countries, and the LBPs 
and abducted children are forced to pay the price. The time has come 
for addressing noncompliance so that the Convention can provide the 
legal recourse and protection of children and families that it was in-
tended to provide. House Bill 3240 provides a comprehensive and ap-
propriate response that would provide this missing element of the Con-
vention. For the sake of all families like the Goldmans, this bill warrants 
Congress’ serious consideration. 
